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(p.	85)	8		The	Indian	Intervention	in	Goa—1961
I.		Facts	and	Context
On	18	December	1961,	some	30,000	Indian	troops	overran	the	district	of	Goa	on	the	west	coast	of	the	Indian	sub-continent,	leaving	the
Portuguese	troops	stationed	there—heavily	outnumbered	and	outgunned—little	choice	but	to	surrender	in	the	course	of	the	next	day	(in	spite
of	orders	to	the	contrary	from	Lisbon).
Together	with	the	districts	of	Daman	and	Diu—which	were	simultaneously	taken	by	Indian	forces—Goa	was	at	the	time	of	the	events	under
Portuguese	authority,	as	it	had	been	since	its	conquest	by	Alfonso	de	Albuquerque	in	1510.	The	presence	of	these	Portuguese	enclaves,	with
a	joint	population	of	c.	650,000	inhabitants,	consisting	mostly	of	ethnic	Indians	(primarily	of	the	Hindu	religion), 	had	long	been	the	source	of	a
slumbering	conflict	between	Portugal	and	India.	Ever	since	becoming	independent,	India,	which	regarded	these	enclaves	as	ethnically,
geographically,	historically,	and	legally	one	with	the	rest	of	India, 	had	indeed	pressed	Portugal	to	negotiate	on	the	end	of	its	colonial	rule	over
these	territories.	Against	this,	Portugal	asserted	that	these	enclaves,	known	collectively	as	Estado	da	Índia,	were	no	colonies	but	formed	an
integral	part	of	Portugal,	and	that	their	transfer	was	non-negotiable.	In	line	with	this	position,	Portugal	refused	to	periodically	report	to	the	UN
on	the	situation	in	these	enclaves,	notwithstanding	the	explicit	affirmation	by	the	UNGA	that	‘Goa	and	dependencies,	called	the	State	of	India’
constituted	non-self-governing	territories	in	the	sense	of	Article	73	of	the	UN	Charter. 	Violent	and	non-violent	protests	against	Portuguese
rule	within	Goa	were	suppressed	by	the	Portuguese	authorities.
Tension	between	Portugal	and	India	over	the	various	districts	increased	considerably	throughout	the	1950s.	In	the	summer	of	1954,	for
instance,	Indian	armed	activists—allegedly	acting	with	the	support	of	the	Indian	authorities—attacked	the	landlocked	exclaves	of	Dadra	and
Nagar	Haveli,	which	were	administratively	part	of,	but	geographically	separated	from,	the	coastal	district	of	Daman,	forcing	the	Portuguese
police	forces	there	to	surrender.	When	Portugal	asked	the	Indian	authorities	for	permission	to	send	reinforcements	to	Dadra	and	Nagar
Haveli,	the	request	was	denied,	leading	Portugal	to	initiate	proceedings	against	India	before	the	International	Court	of	Justice	(in	the	so-called
Right	of	Passage	case). 	One	year	later,	when	several	thousand	unarmed	Indian	activists	attempted
References
(p.	86)	to	enter	Goa,	they	were	violently	repulsed	by	Portuguese	police	officers,	resulting	in	more	than	twenty	casualties 	and	an	ever-
growing	resentment	among	the	Indian	population	against	the	Portuguese	presence	in	Goa.
As	the	likelihood	of	an	armed	confrontation	grew,	various	third	states	urged	a	peaceful	solution	to	the	dispute.	On	10	December	1961,	Indian
Prime	Minister	Jawaharlal	Nehru	asserted	that	‘[c]ontinuance	of	Goa	under	Portuguese	rule	is	an	impossibility’. 	On	18	December,	Indian
forces,	backed	by	air	raids,	rolled	into	the	Portuguese	enclaves	and	took	control	within	a	span	of	48	hours.
As	Indian	forces	were	entering	Goa	on	18	December,	Portugal	requested	the	Security	Council	to	convene	‘immediately	to	put	a	stop	to	the
condemnable	act	of	aggression	of	the	Indian	Union’	and	to	order	an	immediate	ceasefire	and	the	withdrawal	‘of	all	the	invading	forces	of	the
Indian	Union’	from	‘the	Portuguese	territories	of	Goa,	[Daman]	and	Diu’. 	Two	meetings	were	held	in	New	York	later	that	same	day,	revealing
a	deep	rift	between	the	(then)	eleven	members	of	the	Security	Council. 	Two	different	draft	resolutions	were	put	to	the	vote,	yet	neither	was
ultimately	adopted.
Remarkably,	on	the	next	day,	the	UNGA	for	its	part	adopted	a	resolution	condemning	Portugal	for	failing	to	comply	with	its	obligations	as	an
administering	power	under	Chapter	XI	of	the	UN	Charter,	albeit	without	expressly	mentioning	the	situation	in	Goa.
Following	the	Portuguese	defeat,	the	relation	between	India	and	Portugal	long	remained	tense,	and	Portugal	refused	to	recognize	the
incorporation	of	the	districts	of	Goa,	Daman,	and	Diu	into	the	Indian	Republic. 	Relations	between	the	two	states	thawed	only	after	the	end	of
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authoritarian	rule	in	Portugal	in	1974.	In	a	bilateral	treaty	of	31	December	1974	Portugal	eventually	recognized	Indian	sovereignty	over	Goa,
Daman,	and	Diu.
II.		The	Positions	of	the	Main	Protagonists	and	the	Reaction	of	Third	States
and	International	Organizations
The	Indian	intervention	in	Goa	was	discussed	briefly,	if	intensively,	in	two	meetings	of	the	Security	Council,	with	the	two	protagonists	and	the
eleven	Council	members	expressing	strongly	divergent	views	on	the	application	of	the	Charter,	and	of	international	law	more	generally.
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(p.	87)	India	stressed	that	this	was	essentially	‘a	colonial	question’. 	Referring	inter	alia	to	the	historical,	geographical,	and	cultural	ties
between	Goa	and	India	(and	the	geographical	gap	between	Goa	and	Portugal),	India	emphasized	that	Goa	was	‘an	inseparable	part	of	India
and	it	must	come	back	to	India’. 	According	to	India,	Portugal	had	obtained	Goa	through	a	‘process	of	pure	and	simple	conquest’, 	and	had
continued	to	occupy	Goa—and	suppress	its	people—as	a	colonial	power	for	450	years.	This	‘vivisection	of	India’ 	was	unlawful	and	void	ab
initio.	It	was	all	the	more	illegal	in	light	of	the	adoption	by	the	UNGA	of	the	1960	Declaration	on	the	granting	of	independence	to	colonial
countries	and	peoples	(Resolution	1514(XV)), 	according	to	which	immediate	steps	ought	to	be	taken,	in	non-self-governing	territories,	to
transfer	all	powers	to	the	peoples	of	those	territories	in	accordance	with	the	right	of	self-determination.	India	stressed	that	it	had	patiently	tried
to	achieve	a	negotiated	outcome	with	Portugal	over	the	status	of	Goa	and	the	end	of	colonial	rule	there.	Yet,	these	overtures	had	been	without
success,	as	Portugal	had	refused	to	negotiate.	Portugal	thus	did	not	come	to	the	Council	with	‘clean	hands’. 	According	to	India:
[t]he	fact	that	[Portugal]	has	occupied	[Goa]	for	450	years	is	of	no	consequence,	because,	during	nearly	425	or	430	years	of	that
period	we	really	had	no	chance	to	do	anything	because	we	were	under	colonial	domination	ourselves.	But	during	the	last	fourteen
years,	from	the	very	day	when	we	became	independent,	we	have	not	ceased	to	demand	the	return	of	the	peoples	under	illegal
domination	to	their	own	countrymen	…
In	sum,	in	India’s	view,	the	intervention	in	Goa	was	a	matter	of	turning	back	the	clock	of	colonialism	and	restoring	its	sovereignty	over	an
‘inseparable	part	of	India’. 	Realizing	undoubtedly	that	its	line	of	reasoning	was	difficult	to	reconcile	with	the	traditional	reading	of	the	UN
Charter,	India	went	a	step	further	by	asserting	more	fundamentally	that	the	tenet	according	to	which	colonial	powers	have	sovereign	rights
over	territories	which	they	won	by	conquest	in	Asia	and	Africa	was	no	longer	acceptable:	‘It	is	the	European	concept	and	it	must	die.	It	is
time,	in	the	twentieth	century,	that	it	died.’ 	According	to	India,	international	law	was	‘not	a	static	institution’,	but	developed	constantly	in
response	to	‘the	public	opinion	of	the	world’,	including	as	expressed	in	UNGA	Resolution	1514	(XV).
On	a	different	note,	India	also	asserted	that	the	provocation	that	led	to	the	intervention	came	from	Portugal,	not	from	India. 	In	particular,	it
claimed	that	Portugal	had	fired	on	Indian	coastal	steamers	and	fishing	boats,	and	that	it	had	attacked	‘Indian	positions	400	yards	in	our
territory	and	tried	to	destroy	our	police	post	at	Nizampir’.
Furthermore,	at	one	point,	India	appeared	to	frame	its	action	as	a	form	of	self-defence:
[T]he	Charter	itself	does	not	completely	eschew	force,	in	the	sense	that	force	can	be	used	in	self-defence,	for	the	protection	of	the
people	of	a	country	—and	the	people	of	Goa	are	as	much	Indians	as	the	people	of	any	other	part	of	India.
Against	this,	Portugal	accused	India	of	having	committed	‘a	fully	premeditated	and	unprovoked	aggression’,	in	violation	of	the	sovereign
rights	of	Portugal	and	Articles	2(3)	–	(4)	of	the	UN	Charter. 	Portugal	explained	how	India	had	long	harboured	aggressive	intentions	against
the	‘Portuguese	territories	of	Goa’,	as	reflected	in	the	‘vicious	campaign	of	vilification	against	Portugal’, 	the	massing	of	troops	‘near	the
Indo-Portuguese	border’, 	or	the
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(p.	88)	‘sending	[of]	armed	men	into	Portuguese	territory	in	order	to	have	them	firing	into	Indian	territory,	simulating	Portuguese
provocation’. 	Recalling	how	it	had	previously	brought	the	threat	of	Indian	aggression	to	the	attention	of	the	Security	Council, 	Portugal
noted	how	this	threat	had	ultimately	culminated,	on	18	December,	in	the	crossing	of	Indian	troops,	with	tanks	and	artillery,	supported	by	naval
and	air	force	units,	into	Goa,	Daman,	and	Diu.
Portugal	categorically	denied	that	Goa	belonged	to	India,	or	that	it	could	be	labelled	a	‘colony’.	Instead,	it	insisted	that	it	was	an	overseas
‘province’	of	Portugal, 	and	that	the	people	of	Goa	had	been	living	peacefully	‘in	love	of	the	flag	of	Portugal’	for	more	than	450	years, 	‘on	a
basis	of	equality	with	all	the	other	Portuguese	nationals’. 	Portugal	rejected	allegations	that	it	had	massed	troops	in	Goa,	or	engaged	in
some	form	of	provocation. 	It	refuted	India’s	claim	that	it	had	sought	to	resolve	the	dispute	by	peaceful	means,	as	what	India	had	‘always
sought	[was]	annexation	of	the	Portuguese	territories’. 	Furthermore,	India’s	‘so-called	peaceful’	overtures	were	instead	characterized	‘by
violence	[and]	oppression’,	as	illustrated	by	the	imposition	of	an	economic	land	blockade,	the	cutting	off	of	mail	and	railway	services,	the
systematic	organization	of	acts	of	terrorism	and	sabotage,	etc.
In	the	end,	the	Indian	attempt	‘to	annex	the	territories	of	the	other	sovereignties	in	the	neighbourhood	[could]	not	find	any	legal	justification’.
Such	attempt	contravened	the	‘principle	of	sovereignty’	and	was	therefore	contrary	to	international	law. 	Responding	to	India’s	repudiation	of
the	‘European	concept’	of	international	law,	the	Portuguese	ambassador	stressed	that	he	was	‘not	aware	that	international	law	relating	to
sovereignty	has	been	changed	so	far’, 	while	warning	that	‘[i]f	the	principle	of	sovereignty	is	not	respected,	then	there	is	no	knowing	what
conflicts	may	arise	in	every	part	of	the	world,	when	a	nation	decides	to	seize	the	territory	of	another	nation	under	some	pretext	or	another’.
Four	Security	Council	Members—Liberia,	the	Soviet	Union,	the	United	Arab	Republic,	and	Ceylon	(Sri	Lanka)—sided	with	India	in	the
debate.	Like	India,	these	countries	asserted	that	the	matter	was	essentially	‘a	colonial	question’. 	Goa	was	not	an	integral	part	of	Portugal,
as	the	latter	country	maintained. 	Rather,	it	had	been	conquered	by	Portugal	and	had	since	been	a	non-self-governing	territory	under	colonial
domination.	What	is	more,	Portugal	had	consistently	failed	to	comply	with	its	obligations	as	an	administering	power	under	UNGA	Resolution
1514	(XV),	for	example	by	failing	to	report	to	the	UN. 	Contrary	to	France’s	position	in	respect	of	its	colonial	possessions	in	Indian	territory,
Portugal	had	categorically	refused	to	engage	in	negotiations	over	the	end	of	colonial	rule	over	Goa. 	Against	this	background,	the	United
Arab	Republic	stressed	that	‘[c]olonialism	no	longer	has	any	place	in	the	twentieth	century.	It	is	out	of	date	and	Goa	deserves	to	be	freed.
This	is	not	aggression	and	India	is	not	an	aggressive	country’. 	According	to	Ceylon,	the	action
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(p.	89)	taken	by	India	was	‘not	action	taken	against	another	State	for	territorial	aggrandizement,	such	as	was	envisaged	in	the	Charter	…
India’s	action	is	to	liberate	Indian	national	territory’. 	Liberia	for	its	part	raised	the	question,	‘[i]f	the	Council	accepts	that	these	enclaves	are
non-self-governing	territories,	then	how	can	we,	in	the	same	breath,	agree	that	India	has	committed	aggression	on	Portuguese	territory,	when
these	three	enclaves	are	not	part	of	Portuguese	territory?’ 	The	Soviet	Union,	in	particular,	proved	a	staunch	ally	of	India	in	the	debate.
Having	argued	at	the	outset	of	the	debate	that	the	matter	should	not	be	included	on	the	Security	Council’s	agenda,	since	it	fell	‘exclusively
within	the	domestic	jurisdiction	of	India’, 	the	Soviet	Union	went	on	to	‘openly	declare	that	we	side	with	the	people	of	India,	with	the	people	of
Goa	who	are	fighting	to	free	themselves	from	Portugal’s	colonial	domination’, 	while	calling	for	sanctions	against	Portugal.
A	majority	of	the	Security	Council	nonetheless	denounced	the	conduct	of	India. 	On	the	one	hand,	most	of	these	states	did	not	as	such
pronounce	on	the	merits	of	the	territorial	dispute	between	India	and	Portugal —although	some	(notably	(nationalist)	China,	Chile,	and
Ecuador)	did	sympathize	with	India’s	position	that	colonial	possessions	were	illegal	under	modern	international	law	and	that	Portugal
therefore	did	not	have	valid	title	to	Goa. 	Nor	did	these	states	seek	to	justify	Portugal’s	presence	in	Goa	or	its	treatment	of	the	people	of	Goa
—several	even	expressed	sympathy	for	the	strong	feelings	in	India	at	the	continuance	in	the	Indian	subcontinent	of	small	areas	still	under
foreign	rule.
On	the	other	hand,	these	states	affirmed	that	what	was	at	stake	in	the	case	concerned,	was	not	colonialism,	but	rather	the	application	of	the
prohibition	on	the	use	of	force	and	the	obligation	to	settle	disputes	through	peaceful	means. 	More	specifically,	the	majority	view	was	that	the
Indian	intervention	contravened	the	principle	that	force	should	not	be	used	to	settle	territorial	disputes,	and	accordingly	gave	rise	to	a	breach
of	Article	2(4)	of	the	UN	Charter. 	Several	states	expressed	regret	in	particular	that	India	had	refused	to	heed	appeals,	including	from	the
United	States	and	the	United	Kingdom,	and	from	the	UN	Secretary-General,	to	refrain	from	the	use	of	force	and	negotiate. 	Suggestions	that
Portugal	had	provoked	the	Indian	intervention	and/or	that	India	was	acting	in	self-defence	were	dismissed.	Thus,	in	the	words	of	France:	‘[i]n
view	of	the	obvious	disproportion	of
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(p.	90)	the	forces	concerned,	can	anyone	really	assert	that	the	Indian	Union	was	threatened	or	provoked?’
The	United	States	in	particular	proved	a	vocal	critic	of	the	Indian	intervention—which	it	regarded	as	‘a	blow	to	international	institutions,	such
as	the	[UN]’ —and	of	the	justification	put	forward	by	India	in	support—which	it	regarded	as	opening	Pandora’s	box. 	UN	Ambassador	Adlai
Stevenson	forcefully	rejected	the	idea	that	the	Charter	somehow	obliged	states	to	settle	their	international	disputes	by	peaceful	means
‘except	in	cases	of	colonial	areas’:
As	a	matter	of	obvious	fact	and	international	law,	[Goa]	is	under	Portuguese	authority.	This	being	the	case,	India	cannot	lawfully
use	force	against	Goa	especially	when	the	peaceful	methods	in	the	Charter	have	not	been	exhausted.	And	the	claim	that	Portugal
is	the	aggressor	and	not	India,	because	it	has	not	followed	the	recommendation	of	resolution	1514(XV),	requires	an	even	greater
exertion	of	the	imagination	…	[R]esolution	1514(XV)	does	not	authorize	the	use	of	force	for	its	implementation.	It	does	not	and	it
should	not	and	it	cannot,	under	the	Charter.	If	it	did,	the	resolution	would	lead	to	international	chaos,	not	to	national	progress.
Resolution	1514(XV)	does	not	and	cannot	overrule	the	Charter	injunctions	against	the	use	of	armed	force.
In	the	end,	two	draft	resolutions	were	put	to	the	vote. 	A	first	resolution,	sponsored	by	the	United	States,	the	United	Kingdom,	France,	and
Turkey,	‘recalled’	the	prohibition	of	Article	2(4)	of	the	UN	Charter	and	‘deplor[ed]	the	use	of	force	by	India’.	At	the	same	time,	it	called	for	an
immediate	cessation	of	hostilities	and	a	withdrawal	of	Indian	forces.	The	second	resolution,	sponsored	by	Ceylon,	the	United	Arab	Republic,
and	Liberia,	instead	‘recalled’	Resolution	1514	(XV),	while	‘deciding’	to	‘reject	the	Portuguese	complaint	of	aggression	against	India’	and
‘calling	upon’	Portugal	‘to	terminate	hostile	action	and	to	cooperate	with	India	in	the	liquidation	of	her	colonial	possessions	in	India’.	Neither
resolution	was	ultimately	adopted.	The	second	resolution	was	rejected	by	7	votes	to	4.	The	first	resolution	obtained	7	votes	in	favour	and	4
against,	but	was	blocked	by	a	Soviet	veto.
An	overview	of	international	reactions	compiled	by	the	Keesing’s	Record	of	World	Events	reveals	a	similar	rift	as	the	one	in	the	Security
Council,	with	western	states	such	as	the	United	Kingdom,	the	United	States,	Australia,	Canada,	France,	Germany,	the	Netherlands,	New
Zealand,	and	Spain	deploring	or	condemning	India’s	recourse	to	force,	and	countries	such	as	Ceylon,	Communist	China,	Indonesia,	Ghana,
Yugoslavia,	the	Soviet	Union,	Poland,	Czechoslovakia,	Hungary,	Romania,	Bulgaria,	Eastern	Germany,	the	United	Arab	Republic,	Morocco,
and	Tunisia	all	expressing	support	for	India’s	action	in	Goa.
Eventually,	the	day	after	the	debate	within	the	Security	Council,	the	UNGA	on	19	December	adopted	a	resolution	on	the	‘non-compliance	of
the	Government	of	Portugal	with	Chapter	XI	of	the	Charter	of	the	United	Nations	and	with	General	Assembly	Resolution	1542	(XV)’. 	The
resolution	was	adopted	with	a	vote	of	83	against	3	(Spain,
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(p.	91)	Portugal,	and	South	Africa)	with	2	abstentions	(Bolivia	and	France).	Although	the	resolution	contains	no	reference	to	the	situation	of
Goa,	its	adoption	carries	considerable	symbolic	weight	nonetheless.	It	illustrates	the	isolated	diplomatic	position	in	which	Portugal	found
itself	in	the	face	of	a	large	anti-colonial	majority	in	the	UNGA 	and	can	be	seen	as	implicitly	legitimizing	the	Indian	intervention	that	was
launched	the	day	before.	In	the	end,	even	if	several	states	(including	a	majority	of	the	UNSC)	disagreed	with	the	way	in	which	India	had
sought	to	(re-)assert	control	over	Goa,	few	regretted	the	outcome.	The	general	feeling	appeared	to	be	that	the	proper	destiny	of	the	non-self-
governing	territory	of	Goa	consisted	of	its	absorption	by	India. 	Even	if	the	wishes	of	the	Goans	themselves	had	not	been	ascertained	as
such,	this	outcome	was	generally	deemed	to	be	in	accordance	with	the	requirements	of	self-determination.
III.		Questions	of	Legality
If	we	test	the	Indian	intervention	in	Goa	against	the	jus	contra	bellum	as	it	stood	at	the	time	of	the	events,	one	can	hardly	escape	the
conclusion	that	it	amounted	to	a	breach	of	the	prohibition	on	the	use	of	force	in	the	sense	of	Article	2(4)	of	the	UN	Charter	(which	was	also	the
position	taken	by	a	majority	of	the	Security	Council	members).
Article	2(4)	of	the	UN	Charter	indeed	prohibits	the	recourse	to	force	between	states	in	their	international	relations,	including	for	purposes	of
settling	territorial	disputes.	This	fundamental	tenet	of	the	jus	contra	bellum	has	been	confirmed	on	numerous	occasions,	including	in	the	1974
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Friendly	Relations	Declaration, 	or,	more	recently,	by	the	Ethiopia–Eritrea	Claims	Commission, 	and	finds	support	in	state	practice.
Thus,	whenever	a	state	engages	in	forcible	action	in	breach	of	established	demarcation	lines	or	armistice	lines,	or	otherwise	disrupting	the
existing	territorial	status	quo,	Article	2(4)	applies.
If	the	Indian	intervention	clearly	fell	within	the	scope	of	Article	2(4)	of	the	UN	Charter—in	spite	of	implicit	or	explicit	suggestions	to	the
contrary	by	some	Security	Council	members	(see	above)—could	it	nonetheless	be	justified?	On	the	one	hand,	it	is	clear	that	there	was,	at	the
time,	no	decision	of	the	UNSC	(nor,	for	that	matter,	a	recommendation	of
References
(p.	92)	the	UNGA)	‘authorizing	Indian	action	against	Portugal	in	Goa’ —nor	did	India	suggest	otherwise.
On	the	other	hand,	the	right	of	self-defence	does	not	provide	a	credible	legal	basis	for	the	operation	either.	While	India	cursorily	made
reference	to	the	right	of	self-defence,	it	failed	to	provide	much	clarity	as	to	the	application	of	this	right,	for	example	by	clearly	identifying	an
‘armed	attack’	triggering	such	right.	According	to	Wright,	India	seemed	to	suggest	‘that	military	defense	was	permissible:	(1)	to	defend	Indian
territory	outside	of	Goa	attacked	by	Portuguese	forces;	(2)	to	defend	the	Goan	people	within	Goa	against	Portuguese	oppression;	and	(3)	to
defend	buildings	within	Goa	from	destruction	by	mines.’
Yet,	upon	closer	scrutiny,	there	appears	to	be	no	authoritative	evidence	that	any	deliberate	attack	authorized	by	Portugal	took	place 	(or	was
even	imminent).	The	Indian	Government	itself	provided	no	details	of	any	Portuguese	aggressive	action	outside	of	Goa,	but	merely	referred	to
a	number	of	incidents	which	it	had	itself	described	as	trivial. 	Furthermore,	inasmuch	as	the	emphasis	on	the	protection	of	the	people	of	Goa
should	be	read	as	an	implicit	reference	to	the	‘protection	of	nationals’	doctrine, 	it	must	be	recalled	that:	(i)	this	doctrine	was	(and	still
remains)	highly	controversial	among	states	and	legal	scholars; 	and	that	(ii)	the	people	of	Goa	were	in	any	case	not	Indian	nationals	at	the
time	of	the	intervention,	but	rather	citizens	of	a	non-self-governing	territory	under	Portuguese	control.	Invoking	‘protection	of	nationals’	as	a
justification	for	the	Indian	intervention	would	thus—as	Wright	correctly	observed—have	presupposed	an	‘extension	of	the	concept	of	self-
defense	[that	had]	no	basis	in	international	law’.
The	Indian	self-defence	claim—ambiguous	though	it	would	seem—also	appears	to	suggest	that	India	deemed	itself	competent	to	‘defend’
Goa	itself	against	Portuguese	attacks/aggression.	The	underlying	reasoning	appears	to	be	that	the	initial	conquest	of	Goa	by	Portugal
constituted	the	relevant	‘armed	attack’,	and	that	this	attack	continued	to	justify	Indian	action	in	self-defence	some	450	years	after	the	initial
events.	According	to	India	‘[t]he	fact	that	[Portugal]	has	occupied	[Goa]	for	450	years	is	of	no	consequence,	because,	during	nearly	425	or	430
years	of	that	period	we	really	had	no	chance	to	do	anything	because	we	were	under	colonial	domination	ourselves’. 	Clearly,	the
qualification	of	Portugal’s	conquest	and	de	facto	possession	of	Goa	as	a	continuing	armed	attack	against	India	justifying	Indian	action	in	self-
defence	is	fundamentally	at	odds	with	the	traditional	understanding	of	the	jus	contra	bellum	in	the	Charter	era.	On	the	one	hand,	the	argument
overlooks	the	fact	that	the	prohibition	of	territorial	conquest	(and	the	concomitant	doctrine	of	non-recognition	of	territorial	conquest)	‘was	not
the	law	in	1510,	when	Albuquerque	conquered	Goa’. 	On	the	other	hand,	it	ignores	the	fact	that,	pursuant	to	the	necessity	criterion,	for	action
in	self-defence	to	be	lawful,	there	should	in	principle	be	a	close	proximity	in	time	between	the	start	of	the	latter	attack	and	the	response	in
self-defence. 	The	basic	idea	behind	the	need	for	such	temporal	link	(also	known	as	the	(p.	93)	requirement	of	‘immediacy’)	is	to	avoid	self-
defence	being	available	to	sanction	countless	past	acts	of	aggression	or	conquest. 	The	‘immediacy’	aspect	thus	serves	as	an	important
factor	to	distinguish	lawful	self-defence	and	unlawful	armed	reprisals	and	makes	clear	that	hostilities	may	not	be	re-opened	at	a	much	later
stage	without	the	occurrence	of	a	new	casus	foederis. 	In	the	words	of	Wright:
A	state	that	neglects	to	defend	its	frontiers	against	hostile	encroachments	soon	loses	its	right	to	do	so,	and	can	rely	only	on
negotiation	or	action	by	the	United	Nations	to	restore	its	rightful	possession	…	While	this	period	of	time	might	vary	according	to
the	accessibility	of	the	boundary	in	question	or	other	circumstances,	it	seems	clear	that	a	concept	of	continuing	aggression	by
Portugal	against	Goa	beginning	in	1510	and	giving	India	a	right	to	engage	in	defense	of	the	territory,	even	though	that	right	had	not
been	exercised	for	450	years,	has	no	legal	merit.
It	follows	that	the	Indian	self-defence	claim	must	be	dismissed:	either	there	was	(in	1961)	no	‘armed	attack’	triggering	the	right	of	self-defence
to	begin	with,	or	there	was	no	attack	justifying	anything	going	beyond	limited	on-the-spot	reaction	by	Indian	forces.	Put	differently:	either	India
was	not	entitled	to	act	in	self-defence,	or	its	action	was	grossly	disproportionate	to	alleged	provocations	from	the	Portuguese	side.	Similar
positions	discarding	India’s	self-defence	claim	were	voiced	in	the	course	of	the	Security	Council	debates	by	France,	China,	and	the	United
States	(see	above).
As	mentioned	above,	four	Security	Council	members—including,	most	notably,	the	Soviet	Union—nonetheless	accepted	India’s	argument
that	the	colonial	context	fundamentally	altered	the	situation,	and	rendered	the	intervention	lawful.	The	precise	legal	basis	was	not,	however,
elaborated	in	any	detail	by	the	states	concerned,	thus	making	it	difficult	to	distill	much	in	terms	of	opinio	juris	from	the	Security	Council
debate.	Inasmuch	as	it	is	accepted	that	the	immediacy	requirement	is	an	integral	part	of	the	right	of	self-defence	and	that	the	recovery	of
territory	which	is	unlawfully	occupied	by	another	state	is	in	principle	fully	covered	by	the	scope	of	the	prohibition	on	the	use	of	force,	two
options	would	seem	to	remain	at	least	theoretically	available.	First,	it	could	be	claimed	that	the	recovery	of	territory	under	colonial	domination
was	not	caught	by	Article	2(4)	of	the	UN	Charter,	since	it	did	not	contravene	‘the	purposes	of	the	United	Nations’,	but	rather	sought	to	achieve
these	purposes	(which	include,	under	Article	1(2)	UN	Charter,	the	principle	of	self-determination).	Alternatively,	one	could	(theoretically)
claim	the	emergence	of	a	new	exception	to	the	prohibition	on	the	use	of	force	under	customary	international	law,	permitting	the	forcible
recovery	of	(contiguous?)	territory	under	colonial	domination.	It	is	clear,	however,	that	both	interpretations	constituted,	at	the	time	of	the
events,	a	radical	departure	of	the	existing	jus	contra	bellum	framework.
Cognizant	of	this	fact,	India	and	the	Security	Council	members	supporting	it,	placed	considerable	emphasis	on	the	‘Declaration	on	the
granting	of	independence	to	colonial	countries	and	peoples’	(Resolution	1514	(XV))	adopted	by	the	UNGA	in	December	1960,	and	on	the
failure	of	Portugal	to	comply	with	its	duties	under	Chapter	XI	of	the	UN	Charter	as	the	administering	power	of	Goa.	Yet,	even	leaving	aside	the
non-binding
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(p.	94)	nature	of	UNGA	resolutions	and	leaving	aside	the	short	time	span	that	had	elapsed	since	the	adoption	of	Resolution	1514	(XV),	the
simple	fact	remains	that	the	resolution	did	not—as	US	ambassador	Stevenson	was	keen	to	point	out 	—authorize	the	use	of	force	for	its
implementation.	No	indication	to	the	contrary	could	be	found	in	the	text.	What	is	more,	it	is	highly	probable	that	the	resolution	would	never
have	been	adopted	if	it	had	been	drafted	otherwise. 	This	is	also	borne	out	by	the	fact	that	a	majority	of	the	Security	Council	members
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resisted	such	reading	of	the	resolution.	Again,	in	the	words	of	Wright:
The	United	Nations	undoubtedly	recognizes	the	duty	of	administering	Powers	to	emancipate	their	colonies	and	the	moral	right	of
the	inhabitants	of	these	colonies	to	self-determination,	but	it	has	never	suggested	that	an	outside	state,	on	its	own	initiative,	could
invade	a	colony	and	annex	it.	In	fact,	the	explicit	assertion	in	Article	73	[UN	Charter]	that	obligations	concerning	non-self-
governing	territories	are	‘within	the	system	of	international	peace	and	security,	established	by	the	present	Charter’	seems	to
prevent	such	an	interpretation.
It	follows	that	the	Indian	intervention	was	manifestly	unlawful	under	the	international	legal	framework	governing	the	use	of	force	as	it	stood	at
the	time	of	the	events.	Whether	it	nonetheless	contributed	to	a	modification,	or	erosion,	of	that	legal	framework	is	a	different	matter	altogether
—one	we	must	now	turn	to.
IV.		Conclusion:	Precedential	Value
The	Indian	intervention	in	Goa	received	only	limited	attention	in	legal	doctrine	at	the	time	of	the	events,	and	has,	more	recently,	largely	fallen
into	oblivion.	In	spite	thereof,	the	evening	air	in	New	York	on	18	December	1961	was	swollen	with	a	sense	of	history	in	the	making	(and	law	in
the	breaking	(or	at	least	changing)).	Indeed,	while	the	discussions	pertained	to	a	small-scale	(if	not	tiny)	enclave	on	the	Indian	subcontinent,
the	members	of	the	Security	Council	felt	this	was	a	historical	case	nonetheless.	The	US	ambassador	to	the	UN,	Adlai	Stevenson,	who	was
also	present	at	the	birth	of	the	UN,	felt	compelled	to	‘add	a	word	of	epilogue	to	this	fateful	discussion,	by	far	the	most	important	in	which	I	have
participated	since	this	Organization	was	founded	sixteen	years	ago’:
Tonight	we	are	witnessing	the	first	act	in	a	drama	which	would	end	with	the	death	of	the	Organization.	The	League	of	Nations	died,
I	remind	you,	when	its	members	no	longer	resisted	the	use	of	aggressive	force	…	[W]e	have	witnessed	tonight	an	effort	to	rewrite
the	Charter,	to	sanction	the	use	of	force	in	international	relations	when	it	suits	one’s	own	purposes.	This	approach	can	only	lead	to
chaos	and	to	the	disintegration	of	the	United	Nations.
The	Soviet	ambassador	objected	to	Stevenson’s	‘dramatic	statement’	as	follows:
Today	saw,	not	the	beginning	of	the	end	of	the	United	Nations,	but	the	expression	of	the	will	to	defend	colonial	countries	and
peoples	and	their	right	to	life,	freedom	and	independence.	The	fact	that	the	Council	rejected	proposals	aimed	at	supporting	the
colonial	Powers,	at	supporting	their	colonial	right	to	oppress,	proves	the	merit	of	the	Council,	not	its	weakness.
In	many	respects,	the	Indian	intervention	in	Goa	effectively	presented	itself	as	a	game-changer	for	the	UN	and	for	international	law	in	general.
For	the	first	time	since	its	inception,	the	Security	Council	failed	to	condemn	a	case	of	territorial	annexation	in	manifest	breach	of	the
prohibition	on	the	use	of	force. 	What	is	more,	several	members	of	the
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(p.	95)	Security	Council	explicitly	approved	the	intervention.	Even	more	significant	perhaps	is	the	implicit	support	for	the	intervention	from
the	UNGA	which,	a	mere	day	after	the	start	of	the	intervention,	adopted	Resolution	1699	(XVI),	condemning	the	continuing	non-compliance	of
Portugal	with	its	obligations	under	Chapter	XI	of	the	UN	Charter	in	respect	of	the	non-self-governing	territories	under	its	control.	Even	states
that	disagreed	with	the	way	in	which	India	had	(militarily)	(re-)asserted	control	over	Goa	appeared	to	acknowledge	that	the	outcome	was	not
completely	undesirable,	as	the	intervention	had	‘rectified	an	injustice,	by	eliminating	a	vestige	of	colonialism’.
The	case	revealed	the	dominant	role	which	the	developing	and	socialist	states	had	come	to	occupy	in	the	UN,	in	particular	in	the	UNGA.	It
moreover	revealed	the	deep	and	fundamental	rift	(largely)	between	the	west	and	the	rest 	on	the	application	of	the	Charter	framework	on	the
prohibition	of	force	in	the	colonial	context,	with	India	and	the	Soviet	Union	leading	the	assault	against	what	many	regarded	as	an	outdated
concept	of	international	law	imposed	upon	the	world	by	the	European	colonial	powers.	As	Wright	notes,	the	significant	feature	of	the	Goa
situation	was	‘that	many	of	the	new	states,	and	also	the	Soviet	Union,	felt	that	colonialism	was	such	an	evil	that	the	use	of	force	to	eliminate	it
should	be	tolerated’. 	In	a	radical	departure	from	the	pre-existing	international	legal	framework,	it	was	ostensibly	deemed	‘just’,	in	the	view
of	these	states,	to	nullify	the	possession	of	overseas	(as	opposed	to	contiguous)	territories	controlled	by	the	colonial	powers	as	soon	as	the
opportunity	arose. 	American	and	European	opinion	in	turn	were	left	shocked	by	the	degree	of	sympathy,	or	even	outright	support,	for	an
action	that	was	so	diametrically	opposed	to	the	prohibition	on	the	use	of	force	and	the	obligation	to	settle	disputes	by	peaceful	means.
Echoing	Adlai	Stevenson’s	‘word	of	epilogue’,	Flory	prophesized	that	the	Goa	incident,	far	from	being	an	isolated	case,	would	leave	its	mark
on	the	UN	system	and	serve	as	a	precedent	in	other	regions	of	the	world.
Did	this	fear	materialize?	In	retrospect,	the	Indian	intervention	in	Goa	certainly	gave	prominence	to	the	concept	of	colonialism	as	a
‘continuing	aggression’.	It	was	one	of	the	first	clashes	in	a	debate	that	would	dominate	the	UNGA	and	the	Security	Council	throughout	the
1960s	and	1970s.	A	distinction	is	nonetheless	in	order	between	the	permissibility	for	third	states	to	provide	support	to	national	liberation
movements,	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	use	of	force	to	recover	‘pre-colonial	title’,	on	the	other	hand.
With	regard	to	the	former	aspect,	a	fierce	debate	would	effectively	continue	throughout	the	1960s	and	1970s	as	to	whether	the	right	of	national
liberation	movements	to	‘struggle’	for	self-determination	included	‘armed’	struggle,	as	well	as	whether	the	right	of	third	states	to	provide
assistance	to	such	groups	included	‘military’	assistance. 	Relevant	provisions	in	UNGA	resolutions	such	as	the	1970	Friendly	Relations
Declaration	or	the	1974	Definition	of	Aggression 	were	deliberately	drafted	in	such	general	and	ambiguous	terms
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(p.	96)	as	to	permit	both	sides	to	interpret	the	provisions	in	a	completely	divergent	manner	should	the	need	arise. 	It	is	noted,	however,	that
no	state	ever	went	as	far	as	to	rely	in	a	specific	case	on	a	right	to	engage	in	a	direct	military	intervention	in	a	war	of	national	liberation	by
sending	troops	to	support	the	national	liberation	movement	concerned. 	In	the	end,	the	debate	was	never	conclusively	settled,	but	instead
dwindled	down	as	the	decolonization	process	neared	its	completion	and	states’	focus	gradually	shifted	from	self-determination	to	counter-
terrorism	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	(and	certainly	after	9/11).
With	regard	to	the	latter	aspect,	history	suggests	that	the	Goa	intervention	was	ultimately	an	isolated	case.	As	Gray	observes,	‘India’s
annexation	of	Goa	is	the	only	instance	where	the	UN	has	eventually	acquiesced	in	the	“recovery”	of	territory	by	force,	despite	its	initial
condemnation	by	a	majority	of	States	in	the	Security	Council’. 	Referring	to	Morocco’s	claim	to	Western	Sahara,	Indonesia’s	claim	to	East
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Timor,	Argentina’s	1982	attempt	to	recover	the	Falklands/Malvinas	and	Iraq’s	invasion	of	Kuwait	in	1990,	Gray	asserts	that	‘[s]ubsequent	use
of	this	argument	based	on	pre-colonial	title	has	been	rejected	by	the	UN’. 	In	a	similar	vein,	referring	to	the	1982	Falklands/Malvinas	War,
Korman	concludes	that	India’s	successful	annexation	of	Goa	‘cannot	be	taken	to	indicate	the	existence	of	a	legal	right	of	reconquest	in	cases
where	a	former	colony	seeks	to	recover	what	it	considers	to	be	its	pre-colonial	frontiers’. 	In	conclusion,	notwithstanding	the	concerns
expressed	by	Stevenson,	the	Indian	intervention	in	Goa,	and	the	reaction	thereto	by	the	international	community,	did	not	give	rise	to	the
creation	in	customary	international	law	of	a	‘colonial	exception’	to	the	prohibition	against	settling	territorial	disputes	by	resort	to	armed	force.
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